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ABSTRACT
Our work considers leveraging crowd signals for detecting fake
news and is motivated by tools recently introduced by Facebook
that enable users to flag fake news. By aggregating users’ flags, our
goal is to select a small subset of news every day, send them to
an expert (e.g., via a third-party fact-checking organization), and
stop the spread of news identified as fake by an expert. The main
objective of our work is to minimize the spread of misinformation
by stopping the propagation of fake news in the network. It is
especially challenging to achieve this objective as it requires de-
tecting fake news with high-confidence as quickly as possible. We
show that in order to leverage users’ flags efficiently, it is crucial
to learn about users’ flagging accuracy. We develop a novel algo-
rithm, Detective, that performs Bayesian inference for detecting
fake news and jointly learns about users’ flagging accuracy over
time. Our algorithm employs posterior sampling to actively trade
off exploitation (selecting news that maximize the objective value
at a given epoch) and exploration (selecting news that maximize
the value of information towards learning about users’ flagging
accuracy). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach via ex-
tensive experiments and show the power of leveraging community
signals for fake news detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fake news (a.k.a. hoaxes, rumors, etc.) and the spread of misinfor-
mation have dominated the news cycle since the US presidential
election (2016). Social media sites and online social networks, for
example Facebook and Twitter, have faced scrutiny for being unable
to curb the spread of fake news. There are various motivations for
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generating and spreading fake news, for instance, making polit-
ical gains, harming the reputation of businesses, as clickbait for
increasing advertising revenue, and for seeking attention1. As a
concrete example, Starbucks recently fell victim to fake news with
a hoax advertisement claiming that the coffee chain would give free
coffee to undocumented immigrants2. While Starbucks raced to
deny this claim by responding to individual users on social media,
the lightening speed of the spread of this hoax news in online social
media highlighted the seriousness of the problem and the critical
need to develop new techniques to tackle this challenge. To this
end, Facebook has recently announced a series of efforts towards
tackling this challenge [10, 11].
Detection via expert’s verification. Fake news and misinforma-
tion have historically been used as tools for making political or
business gains [9]. However, traditional approaches based on veri-
fication by human editors and expert journalists do not scale to the
volume of news content that is generated in online social networks.
In fact, it is this volume as well as the lightening speed of spread in
these networks that makes this problem challenging and requires
us to develop new computational techniques. We note that such
computational techniques would typically complement, and not
replace, the expert verification process—even if a news is detected
as fake, some sort of expert verification is needed before one would
actually block it. This has given rise to a number of third-party
fact-checking organizations such as Snopes3 and Factcheck.org4 as
well as a code of principles [25] that should be followed by these
organizations.
Detection using computational methods. There has been a re-
cent surge in interest towards developing computational methods
for detecting fake news (cf., [7] for a survey)—we provide a more
detailed overview of these methods in the Related Work section.
These methods are typically based on building predictive models
to classify whether a news is fake or not via using a combina-
tion of features related to news content, source reliability, and
network structure. One of the major challenges in training such
predictive models is the limited availability of corpora and the
subjectivity of labelling news as fake [27, 33]. Furthermore, it is
difficult to design methods based on estimating source reliability
1Snopes compiles a list of top 50 fake news stories:
http://www.snopes.com/50-hottest-urban-legends/
2http://uk.businessinsider.com/fake-news-starbucks-free-coffee-to-undocumented-
immigrants-2017-8
3http://www.snopes.com/
4http://factcheck.org/
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and network structure as the number of users who act as sources
is diverse and gigantic (e.g., over one billion users on Facebook);
and the sources of fake news could be normal users who unin-
tentionally share a news story without realizing that the news is
fake. A surge of interest in the problem and in overcoming these
technical challenges has led to the establishment of a volunteer-
ing based association—FakeNewsChallenge5—comprising over 100
volunteers and 70 teams which organizes machine learning compe-
titions related to the problem of detecting fake news.
1.1 Leveraging users’ flags.
Given the limitation of the current state-of-the-art computational
methods, an alternate approach is to develop hybrid human-AI
methods via engaging users of online social networks by enabling
them to report fake news. In fact, Facebook has recently taken
steps towards this end by launching a fake news reporting tool in
Germany [11], as shown in Figure 1. The idea of this tool is that as
news propagates through the network, users can flag the news as
fake.
Figure 1: Facebook has launched tools in Germany to report
fake news. Image source: [11].
As proposed by Facebook [11], the aggregated users’ flags as well as
well as other available signals can be used to identify a set of news
which potentially is fake. These news can then be sent to an expert
for review via a third-party fact-checking organization. If an expert
labels the news as fake, it could be removed from the network or
marked as disputed making it appear lower in news-feed ranking.
The contemporary work by Kim et al. [16] explored the idea of
detecting fake news via leveraging users’ flagging activity by using
the framework of marked temporal point processes. We highlight
the key differences of their approach to ours in the next section.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we develop algorithmic tools to effectively utilize the
power of the crowd (flagging activity of users) to detect fake news.
Given a set of news, our goal is to select a small subset of k news,
send them to an expert for review, and then block the news which
are labeled as fake by the expert. We formalize our objective as to
5http://www.fakenewschallenge.org/
minimize the spread of misinformation, i.e., how many users end up
seeing a fake news before it is blocked. We design our algorithm
Detective, which implements a Bayesian approach for learning
about users’ accuracies over time aswell as for performing inference
to find which news are fake with high confidence. In short, our
main contributions include:
• We formalize the problem of leveraging users’ flagging ac-
tivity for detection of fake news. We showcase the need to
learn about users’ accuracy in order to effectively leverage
their flags in a robust way.
• We develop a tractable Bayesian algorithm, Detective, that
actively trades off between exploitation (selecting news that
directly maximize the objective value) and exploration (se-
lecting news that helps towards learning about users’ flag-
ging accuracy).
• We perform extensive experiments using a publicly available
Facebook dataset to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach. We plan to make the code publicly available so
that other researchers can build upon our techniques for this
important and timely problem of detecting fake news.
2 RELATEDWORK
Contemporary results. Kim et al. [16] explored the idea of detect-
ing fake news via leveraging users’ flagging activity. In particular,
they introduce a flexible representation of the above problem using
the framework of marked temporal point processes. They develop
an algorithm, Curb, to select which news to send for fact-checking
via solving a novel stochastic optimal control problem. The key
technical differences of the approach by Kim et al. [16] to ours are:
(1) we learn about the flagging accuracy of individual users in an
online setting; in contrast, they consider all users to be equally
reliable and estimate the flagging accuracy of the population of
users from historical data; (2) our algorithms are agnostic to the
actual propagation dynamics of news in the network; they model
the actual propagation dynamics as a continuous-time dynamical
system with jumps and arrive at an algorithm by casting the prob-
lem as an optimal control problem; and (3) we use discrete epochs
with a fixed budget per epoch (i.e., the number of news that can
be sent to an expert for reviewing); they use continuous time and
consider an overall budget for their algorithm.
Computational methods for detecting fake news. There is a
large body of related work on rumor detection and information
credibility evaluation (with a more recent focus on fake news de-
tection) that are applicable to the problem of detecting fake news.
These methods are typically based on building predictive models
to classify whether a news is fake. At a high-level level, we can cat-
egorize these methods as follows: (i) based on features using news
content via natural language processing techniques [13, 31, 34, 38];
(ii) via learning models of source reliability and trustworthiness
[20, 22, 28]; (iii) by analyzing the network structure over which a
news propagated [6]; and (iv) based on a combination of the above-
mentioned features, i.e., linguistic, source, and network structure
[1, 17, 18, 35]. As we pointed out in the Introduction, there are
several key challenges in building accurate predictive models for
identifying fake news including limited availability of corpora, sub-
jectivity in ground truth labels, and huge variability in the sources
who generate fake news (often constituting users who do it unin-
tentionally). In short, these methods alone have so far proven to be
unsuccessful in tackling the challenge of detecting fake news.
Leveraging crowd signals forweb applications.Crowdsourcing
has been used in both industrial applications and for research stud-
ies in the context of different applications related to web security.
For instance, [23] and [5] have evaluated the potential of leveraging
the wisdom of crowds for assessing phishing websites and web
security. Their studies show a high variability among users—(i)
the participation rates of users follows a power-law distribution,
and (ii) the accuracy of users’ reports vary, and users with more
experience tend to have higher accuracy. The authors also discuss
the potential of voting fraud when using users’ reports for security
related applications. Wang et al. [32] performed a crowdsourcing
study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for the task of sybil detection
in online social networks. Their studies show that there is a huge
variability among crowd users in terms of their reporting accura-
cies that needs to be taken into account for building a practical
system. Chen et al. [3], Zheleva et al. [39] present a system sim-
ilar to that of ours for the task of filtering email spam and SMS
spam, respectively. The authors discuss a users’ reputation system
whereby reliable users (based on history) can be weighted more
when aggregating the reports. However, their work assumes that
users’ reputation/reliability is known to the system, whereas the fo-
cus of our paper is on learning users’ reputation over time. Freeman
[12] discusses the limitations of leveraging user feedback for fake
account detection in online social networks—via data-driven stud-
ies using Linkedin data, the authors show that there is only a small
number of skilled users (who have good accuracy that persists over
time) for detecting fake accounts.
Crowdsourcing with expert validation On a technical side, our
approach can be seen as that of a semi-supervised crowdsourcing
technique where users’ answers can be validated via an external
expert. Hung et al. [14], Liu et al. [21] present probabilistic models
to select specific news instances to be labeled by experts that would
maximize the reduction in uncertainty about users’ accuracy.With a
similar flavor to ours, Zhao et al. [36] presents a Bayesian approach
to aggregate information from multiple users, and then jointly
infer users’ reliability as well as ground truth labels. Similar to our
approach, they model users’ accuracy via two separate parameters
for false positive and false negative rates. However, their approach
is studied in an unsupervised setting where no expert validation
(ground truth labels) are available.
3 THE MODEL
We provide a high-level specification of our model in Protocol 1.
There is an underlying social network denoted asG = (U ,E) where
U is the set of users in the network. We divide the execution into
different epochs denoted as t = 1, 2, . . . ,T , where each epoch could
denote a time window, for instance, one day. Below, we provide
details of our model—the process of news generation and spread,
users’ activity of flagging the news, and selecting news to get ex-
pert’s labels.
3.1 News Generation and Spread
We assume that new news, denoted by the set X t , are generated
at the beginning of every epoch t (cf., line 4).6 In this paper, we
consider a setting where each news has an underlying label (un-
known to the algorithm) of being “fake" (f ) or “not fake" ( f¯ ). We
use random variable Y ∗(x) to denote this unknown label for a news
x and its realization is given by y∗(x) ∈ { f , f¯ }. The label y∗(x) can
only be acquired if news x is sent to an expert for reviewwho would
then provide the true label. We maintain a set of “active" news At
(cf., line 5) which consists of all news that have been generated
by the end of epoch t but for which expert’s label have not been
acquired yet.
Each news x is associated with a source user who seeded this news,
denoted as ox (cf., line 4). We track the spread of news in the set
At via a function π t : At → 2U . For a news a ∈ At , the function
π t (a) returns the set of users who have seen the news a by the end
of epoch t . During epoch t , let ut (a) ⊆ U \ π t−1(a) be the set of
additional users (possibly the empty set) to whom news a ∈ At
propagates in epoch t , hence π t (a) = π t−1(a) ∪ ut (a) (cf., line 9).
3.2 Users’ Activity of Flagging the News
In epoch t , when a news a ∈ At propagates to a new user u ∈ ut (a),
this user can flag the news to be fake. We denote the set of users
who flag news a as fake in epoch t via a set lt (a) ⊆ ut (a) (cf.,
line 10). Furthermore, the functionψ t (a) returns the complete set
of users who have flagged the news a as fake by the end of epoch
t .7 For any news x and any user u ∈ U , we denote the label user
u would assign to x via a random variable Yu (x). We denote the
realization of Yu (x) as yu (x) ∈ { f , f¯ } where yu (x) = f signifies
that user has flagged the news as fake. In this paper, we consider a
simple, yet realistic, probabilistic model of a user’s flagging activity
as discussed below.
User abstaining from flagging activity. Reflecting the behavior
of real-world users, user u might abstain from actively reviewing
the news content (and by default, does not flag the news)—wemodel
this happening with a probability γu ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, we can
think of 1 − γu as the engagement of user u while participating in
this crowdsourcing effort to detect fake news: γu = 1 means that
the user is not participating at all.
User’s accuracy in flagging the news.With probability (1−γu ),
useru reviews the content of news x and labels the news. We model
the accuracy/noise in the user’s labels, conditioned on that the user
is reviewing the content, as follows:
• αu ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that user u would not flag
the news as fake, conditioned on that news x is not fake and
the user is reviewing the content.
• βu ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that user u would flag the
news as fake, conditioned on that news x is fake and the user
is reviewing the content.
User’s observed activity. Putting this together, we can quantify
the observed flagging activity of user u for any news x with the
6For simplicity of presentation, we consider every news generated in the network to
be unique. In real-world settings, the same news might be posted by multiple users
because of externalities, and it is easy to extend our model to consider this scenario.
7Note that as per specification of Protocol 1, for any news x , the source user ox doesn’t
participate in flagging x .
Protocol 1: High-level specification of our model
1 Input: social network graph G = (U ,E); labeling budget per epoch k .
2 Initialize: active news A0 = {} (i.e., news for which expert’s label is not acquired yet).
3 foreach t = 1, 2, . . . ,T do
/* At the beginning of epoch t */
4 News X t are generated with ox ∈ U as the origin/source of x ∈ X t .
5 Update the set of active news as At = At−1 ∪ X t . ∀x ∈ X t , do the following:
6 Initialize users exposed to the news x as π t−1(x) = {}.
7 Initialize users who flagged the news x asψ t−1(x) = {}.
/* During the epoch t */
8 News At continue to propagate in the network. ∀a ∈ At , do the following:
9 News a propagates to more users ut (a) ⊆ U \ π t−1(a); i.e., π t (a) = π t−1(a) ∪ ut (a).
10 News a is flagged as fake by users lt (a) ⊆ ut (a); i.e.,ψ t (a) = ψ t−1(a) ∪ lt (a).
/* At the end of epoch t */
11 Algorithm Algo selects a subset St ⊆ At of up to size k to get expert’s labels given by y∗(s) ∈ { f , f¯ } ∀ s ∈ St .
12 Block the fake news, i.e., ∀s ∈ St s.t. y∗(s) = f , remove s from the network.
13 Update the set of active news as At = At \ St
Note that news s ∈ S t s.t. y∗(s) = f¯ remain in the network, continue to propagate, and being flagged by users
following matrix defined by variables (θu, f¯ ,θu,f ):[
θu, f¯ 1 − θu,f
1 − θu, f¯ θu,f
]
= γu
[
1 1
0 0
]
+ (1 − γu )
[
αu 1 − βu
1 − αu βu
]
where 
θu, f¯ ≡ P
(
Yu (x) = f¯ | Y ∗(x) = f¯
)
1 − θu, f¯ ≡ P
(
Yu (x) = f | Y ∗(x) = f¯
)
θu,f ≡ P
(
Yu (x) = f | Y ∗(x) = f
)
1 − θu,f ≡ P
(
Yu (x) = f¯ | Y ∗(x) = f
)
The two parameters (αu , βu ) allow us to model users of different
types that one might encounter in real-world settings. For instance,
• a user with (αu ≥ 0.5, βu ≤ 0.5) can be seen as a “news
lover" who generally tends to perceive the news as not fake;
on the other hand, a user with (αu ≤ 0.5, βu ≥ 0.5) can be
seen as a “news hater" who generally tends to be skeptical
and flags the news (i.e., label it as fake).
• a user with (αu = 1, βu = 1) can be seen as an “expert” who
always labels correctly; a user with (αu = 0, βu = 0) can be
seen as a “spammer” who always labels incorrectly.
3.3 Selecting News to Get Expert’s Label
At the end of every epoch t , we apply an algorithmAlgo—on behalf
of the network provider—which selects news St ⊆ At to send to an
expert for reviewing and acquiring the true labels y∗(s) ∀s ∈ St (cf.,
line 11). If a news is labeled as fake by the expert (i.e., y∗(s) = f ),
this news is then blocked from the network (cf., line 12). At the
end of the epoch, the algorithm updates the set of active news as
At = At \St (cf., line 13). We will develop our algorithm in the next
section; below we introduce the formal objective of minimizing the
spread of misinformation via fake news in the network.
3.4 Objective: Minimizing the Spread of Fake
News
Let’s begin by quantifying the utility of blocking a news a ∈ At
at epoch t—it is important to note that, by design, only the fake
news are being blocked in the network. Recall that |π t (a)| denotes
the number of users who have seen news a by the end of epoch t .
We introduce |π∞(a)| to quantify the number of users who would
eventually see the news a if we let it spread in the network. Then, if
a news a is fake, we define the utility of blocking news a at epoch
t as valt (a) = |π∞(a)| − |π t (a)|, i.e., the utility corresponds to the
number of users saved from being exposed to fake news a. If an
algorithm Algo selects set St in epoch t , then the total expected
utility of the algorithm for t = 1, . . . ,T is given by
Util(T ,Algo) =
T∑
t=1
E
[ ∑
s ∈S t
1{y∗(s)=f }valt (s)
]
(1)
where the expectation is over the randomness of the spread of news
and the randomness in selecting St ∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,T }.
In this work, we will assume that the quantity valt (a) in Equation 1
can be estimated by the algorithm. For instance, this can be done by
fitting parameters of an information cascade model on the spread
π t (a) seen so far for news a, and then simulating the future spread
by using the learnt parameters [8, 26, 37].
Given the utility values valt (·), we can consider an oracle Oracle
that has access to the true labels y∗(·) for all the news and maxi-
mizes the objective in Equation 1 by simply selecting k fake news
with highest utility. In the next section, we develop our algorithm
Detective that performs Bayesian inference to computey∗(·) using
the flagging activity of users as well as via learning users’ flagging
accuracy {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U from historic data.
4 OUR METHODOLOGY
In this section we present our methodology and our algorithm
Detective. We start by describing how news labels can be inferred
for the case in which users’ parameters are fixed. Next, we consider
the case in which users’ parameters are unknown and employ a
Bayesian approach for inferring news labels and learning users’ pa-
rameters. Given a prior distributions on the users’ parameters and
a history of observed data (users’ flagging activities and experts’
labels obtained), one common approach is to compute a point esti-
mate for the users’ parameters (such asMAP) and use that. However,
this can lead to suboptimal solutions because of limited exploration
towards learning users’ parameters. In Detective, we overcome
this issue by employing the idea of posterior sampling [24, 29].
4.1 Inferring News Labels: Fixed Users’ Params
We take a Bayesian approach to deal with unknown labels y∗(·) for
maximizing the objective in Equation 1. As a warm-up, we begin
with a simpler setting where we fix the users’ labeling parameters
(θu, f¯ ,θu,f ) for all users u ∈ U . Let’s consider epoch t and news
a ∈ At for which we want to infer the true label y∗(a). Let ω be the
prior that a news is fake; then, we are interested in computing:
P(Y ∗(a) = f | {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U ,ω,ψ t (a),π t (a))
∝ ω ·
∏
u ∈ψ t (a)
P
(
Yu (a) = f | Y ∗(a) = f ,θu,f
)
·∏
u ∈π t (a)\ψ t (a)
P
(
Yu (a) = f¯ | Y ∗(a) = f ,θu,f
)
= ω ·
∏
u ∈ψ t (a)
θu,f ·
∏
u ∈π t (a)\ψ t (a)
(1 − θu,f )
where the last two steps follow from applying Bayes rule and as-
suming that users’ labels are generated independently. Note that
both users’ parameters {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U affect the posterior proba-
bility of a news being fake as the normalization constant depends
on both P(Y ∗(a) = f | ·) and P(Y ∗(a) = f¯ | ·).
At every time t ∈ {1, . . . ,T }, we can use the inferred posterior prob-
abilities to greedily select k news St ⊆ At , |St | = k that maximize
the total expected utility, i.e.,∑
s ∈S t
P(Y ∗(s) = f | ·) · valt (s). (2)
This greedy selection can be performed optimally by selecting k
news with the highest expected utility. This is implemented in our
algorithm TopX, shown in Algorithm 2.
4.2 Inferring News Labels: Learning Users’
Params
In our setting, the users’ parameters {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U are unknown
and need to be learnt over time.
Learning about users. We assume a prior distribution over the
users’ parameters (Θf¯ ,Θf ) shared among all users. For each user
u ∈ U , we maintain the data history in form of the following matrix:
Dtu =

dt
u, f¯ |f¯ d
t
u, f¯ |f
dt
u,f |f¯ d
t
u,f |f
 .
The entries of this matrix are computed from the news for which
experts’ labels were acquired. For instance, dt
u, f¯ |f¯ represents the
Algorithm 2: Algorithm TopX
1 Input:
• Active news At ; information valt (·), lt (·),π t (·)
• budget k ; news prior ω
• users’ parameters {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U .
2 Compute p(a) for all a ∈ At as
P(Y ∗(a) = f | {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U ,ω, lt (a),π t (a))
3 Select
St = arg maxS ⊆At , |S | ≤k
∑
a∈S p(a)valt (a)
4 Return: St
count of how often the user u labeled a news as not fake and the
acquired expert’s label was not fake.
GivenDtu , we can compute the posterior distribution over the users’
parameters using Bayes rules as follows:
P(θu, f¯ | Θf¯ ,Dtu ) ∝ P(Dtu | θu, f¯ ) · P(θu, f¯ | Θf¯ )
= (θu, f¯ )
d t
u, f¯ |f¯ · (1 − θu, f¯ )
d t
u, f |f¯ · P(θu, f¯ | Θf¯ )
Similarly, one can compute P(θu,f | ·).
Inferring labels.We can now use the users’ parameters posteriors
distributions to infer the labels, for instance, by first computing the
MAP parameters
θMAP
u, f¯
= arg max
θu, f¯
P(θu, f¯ | Θf¯ ,Dtu )
(and θMAPu,f similarly) and invoking the results from the previous
section.8 Then, at every epoch t we can invoke TopXwith a point es-
timate for the users’ parameters to select a set St of news. However
this approach can perform arbitrarily bad compared to an algorithm
that knows the true users’ parameters (we refer to this algorithm
as Opt) as we show in our analysis. The key challenge here is that
of actively trading off exploration (selecting news that maximize
the value of information towards learning users’ parameters) and
exploration (selecting news that directly expected utility at a given
epoch). This is a fundamental challenge that arises in sequential
decision making problems, e.g., in multi-armed bandits [2], active
search [4, 30] and reinforcement learning.
4.3 Our Algorithm Detective
In this section, we present our algorithm Detective, shown in
Algorithm 3, that actively trades off between exploration and ex-
ploitation by the use of posterior sampling aka Thompson sam-
pling [24, 29]. On every invocation, the algorithm samples the
users’ parameters from the current users’ posterior distributions
and invokes TopX with these parameters. Intuitively, we can think
of this approach as sampling users’ parameters according to the
probability they are optimal.
Analysis. We analyze our algorithms in a simplified variant of
Protocol 1, in particular we make the following simplifications:
8Note that a fully Bayesian approach for integrating out uncertainty about users’
parameters in this case is equivalent to using the mean point estimate of the posterior
distribution.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm Detective
1 Input:
• user priors Θf ,Θf¯ ; users’ histories {Dtu }u ∈U .
2 Sample
θu, f¯ ∼ P(θu, f¯ | Θf¯ ,Dtu ), θu,f ∼ P(θu,f | Θf ,Dtu )
3 St ← Invoke TopX with parameters {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U
4 Return: St
(1) There areM sources o1, . . . ,oM , each generating news every
epoch t .
(2) For any news x seeded at epoch t , valτ (x) > 0 only for τ = t .
This means that news x reaches it maximum spread at the
next timestep t + 1, hence the utility of detecting that news
drops to 0.
To state our theoretical results, let us introduce the regret of an
algorithm Algo as
Regret(T ,Algo) = Util(T ,Opt) − Util(T ,Algo).
We can now immediately state our first theoretical result, highlight-
ing the necessity of exploration.
Proposition 1. Any algorithm Algo using deterministic point
estimates for the users’ parameters suffers linear regret, i.e.,
Regret(T ,Algo) = Θ(T ).
Proof sketch. The proof follows by considering a simple prob-
lem involving two users, where we have perfect knowledge about
one user with parameters (0.5+ ϵ, 0.5+ ϵ) and the other user either
has parameters (1, 1) or (0, 0) (expert or spamer). The key idea here
is that any algorithm using point estimates can be tricked into al-
ways making decisions based on the first user’s flagging activities
and is never able to learn about the perfect second user. □
The above result is a consequence of insufficient exploration
which is overcome by our algorithm Detective, as formalized by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The expected regret of our algorithm Detective
is E[Regret(T ,Detective)] = O(C√M ′T log(CM ′T )), where M ′ =(M
k
)
and C is a problem dependent parameter. C quantifies the total
number of realizations of howM news can spread toU users and how
these users label the news.
Proof sketch. The proof of this theorem follows via interpret-
ing the simplified setting as a reinforcement learning problem. Then,
we can apply the generic results for reinforcement learning via pos-
terior sampling of Osband et al. [24]. In particular, we map our
problem to an MDP with horizon 1 as follows. The actions in the
MDP correspond to selecting k news from the M sources, the re-
ward for selecting a set of news S is given by Equation 2 (evaluated
using the true users’ parameters). □
Given that the regret only grows as O(√T ) (i.e., sublinear in T ),
this theorem implies that Detective converges to Opt as T →∞.
However, as a conservative bound on C could be exponential in
|U | and M , convergence may be slow. Nevertheless, in practice
we observe competitive performance of Detective compared to
Opt as indicated in our experiments. Hence, Detective overcomes
the issues in Proposition 1, and actively trades off exploration and
exploitation.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Social network graph and news generation. We consider the
social circles Facebook graph [19], consisting of 4,039 users (nodes)
U and 88,234 edges, computed from survey data collected by using
a Facebook app for identifying social circles. Every user can be the
seed of news as described shortly and to every user a probability
is assigned with which it (hypothetically) generates fake news in
case it seeds news. In particular, 20% of the users generate fake
news with probability 0.6, 40% of the users generate fake news with
probability 0.2 and the remaining 40% of the users generate fake
news with probability 0.01 (the class of a user is assigned randomly).
For determining the seeds of news, we partition the users into users
Un which commonly spread news and usersUr = U \Un which only
occasionally spread news. That is, in every iteration of Protocol 1,
we selectM = 25 users for generating news, where users inUn are
selected with probability 0.5|Un | and users in Ur are selected with
probability 0.5|Ur | . Hence, in our experimental setup this corresponds
to a prior for seeding fake news of about 20%, i.e., ω ≈ 0.2.
News spreading. In our experiments, news spread according to an
independent cascade model [15], i.e., the diffusion process of every
news is a separate independent cascade with infection probability
0.1 +U[0, 0.1] (fixed when the news is seeded). In every epoch of
Protocol 1, we perform two iterations of the independent cascade
models to determine the news spread at the next epoch.We estimate
the number of users who would eventually see news a, i.e., |π∞(a)|,
by executing the independent cascade models for each news for
600 iterations.
Users’ parameters. In our experiments we consider three types
of users, i.e., good users (αu = βu = 0.9), spammers (αu = βu = 0.1)
and indifferent users (αu = βu = 0.5). Unless specified otherwise,
each user is randomly assigned to one of these three types. Also,
we set γu = 0 unless specified otherwise (note that 1−γu quantifies
the engagement of a user).
Algorithms.We execute Protocol 1 for T = 100 epochs. In every
epoch of Protocol 1, the evaluated algorithms select k = 5 news
to be reviewed by an expert. In our experiments we compare the
performance of Detective, Opt (unrealistic: TopX invoked with
the true users’ parameters), Oracle (unrealistic: knows the true
news labels). In addition, we consider the following baselines:
• Fixed-CM. This algorithm leverages users’ flags without
learning about or distinguishing between users. It uses fixed
users parameters θu, f¯ = θu,f = 0.6 for invoking TopX.
• No-Learn. This algorithm does not learn about users and
does not consider any user flags. It greedily selects those
news with highest valt (·), i.e.,
St = arg max
S ⊆At , |S |=k
∑
s ∈S
valt (s).
• Random. This algorithm selects a random set St ⊆ At , |St | =
k of active news for labeling by experts.
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Figure 2: Experimental results. (a) Learning about users: Detective achieves average utility competitive compared to that
of Oracle (which knows the true news labels). The average utility of Detective converges to that of Opt as Detective
progressively learns the users’ parameters. (b) Users’ engagement in flagging: even with low engagement Detective can
effectively leverage crowd signals to detect fake news. (c) Robustness against spammers: Detective is effective even if the
majority of users is adversarial, highlighting the importance of learning about users’ flagging accuracy for robustly leveraging
crowd signals.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed al-
gorithm for fake news detection in a social network. All reported
utilities are normalized by Util(T ,Oracle) and all results are aver-
aged over 5 runs.
Learning about users and and exploiting user’s flags. In this
experiment we compare the average utility, i.e., 1t Util(t ,Algo) (cf.,
Equation 1), achieved by the different algorithms at epoch t for
t = 1, . . . ,T . The results are shown in Figure 2a. We observe that
Detective and Opt achieve performance close to that of Oracle.
This is impressive, as these algorithms can only use the users’
flags and the users’ parameters {θu, f¯ ,θu,f }u ∈U (or their beliefs
about the users’ parameters in case of Detective) to make their
predictions. We also observe that the performance of Detective
converges to that of Opt as Detective progressively learns the
users’ parameters. The algorithms No-Learn and Random achieve
clearly inferior performance compare to Detective.
Users’ engagement in flagging. In this experiment, we vary the
engagement 1−γu of the users. We report the utilities Util(T ,Algo)
in Figure 2b. We observe that with increasing engagement the per-
formance of Detective and Opt improves while the performance
of the other shown algorithms is not affected by the increased
engagement. Importantly, note that also with a low engagement
Detective can effectively leverage crowd signals to detect fake
news.
Robustness against spammers. In this experiment we consider
only two types of users, i.e., good users and spammers. We vary
the fraction of good users relative to the total number of users.
We report the utilities Util(T ,Algo) achieved by the different algo-
rithms in Figure 2c. We also plot the additional baseline Fixed-CM.
Observe that the performance of Fixed-CM degrades with a de-
creasing fraction of good users. Detective (thanks to learning
about users) is effective even if the majority of users is adversar-
ial. This highlights the fact that it is crucial to learn about users’
flagging accuracy in order to robustly leverage crowd signals.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In our paper we considered the important problem of leveraging
crowd signals for detecting fake news. We demonstrated that any
approach that is not learning about users’ flagging behaviour is
prone to failure in the presence of adversarial/spam users (whowant
to “promote” fake news). We proposed the algorithm Detective
that performs Bayesian inference for detecting fake news and jointly
learns about users over time. Our experiments demonstrate that
Detective is competitive with the fictitious algorithm Opt, which
knows the true users’ flagging behaviour. Importantly, Detective
(thanks to learning about users) is robust in leveraging flags even
if a majority of the users is adversarial. There are some natural
extensions for future work. For instance, it would be useful to
extend our approach to model and infer the trustworthiness of
sources. It would also be important to conduct user studies by
deploying our algorithm in a real-world social system.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the Swiss National Science
Foundation, and Nano-Tera.ch program as part of the Opensense II
project, ERC StG 307036, and aMicrosoft Research Faculty Fellowship.
Adish Singla acknowledges support by a FacebookGraduate Fellowship.
REFERENCES
[1] Carlos Castillo, Marcelo Mendoza, and Barbara Poblete. 2011. Information credi-
bility on twitter. In WWW. 675–684.
[2] Olivier Chapelle and Lihong Li. 2011. An empirical evaluation of thompson
sampling. In NIPS. 2249–2257.
[3] Liang Chen, Zheng Yan, Weidong Zhang, and Raimo Kantola. 2015. TruSMS:
a trustworthy SMS spam control system based on trust management. Future
Generation Computer Systems 49 (2015), 77–93.
[4] Yuxin Chen, Jean-Michel Renders, Morteza Haghir Chehreghani, and Andreas
Krause. 2017. Efficient Online Learning for Optimizing Value of Information:
Theory and Application to Interactive Troubleshooting. In UAI.
[5] Pern Hui Chia and Svein Johan Knapskog. 2011. Re-evaluating the wisdom
of crowds in assessing web security. In International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. 299–314.
[6] Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Prashant Shiralkar, Luis M Rocha, Johan Bollen,
Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. 2015. Computational fact checking
from knowledge networks. PloS one 10, 6 (2015), e0128193.
[7] Niall J Conroy, Victoria L Rubin, and Yimin Chen. 2015. Automatic deception
detection: Methods for finding fake news. Proceedings of the Association for
Information Science and Technology 52, 1 (2015), 1–4.
[8] Nan Du, Le Song, Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez, and Hongyuan Zha. 2013. Scalable
Influence Estimation in Continuous-Time Diffusion Networks. In NIPS. 3147–
3155.
[9] Stuart Ewen. 1998. PR!: a social history of spin. Basic Books.
[10] Facebook. 2016. News Feed FYI: Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News.
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/
12/news-feed-fyi-addressing-hoaxes-and-
fake-news/. (December 2016).
[11] Facebook. 2017. Umgang mit Falschmeldungen (Handling of false alarms).
https://de.newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/
01/umgang-mit-falschmeldungen/. (January 2017).
[12] David Mandell Freeman. 2017. Can You Spot the Fakes?: On the Limitations of
User Feedback in Online Social Networks. In WWW. 1093–1102.
[13] Aditi Gupta, Ponnurangam Kumaraguru, Carlos Castillo, and Patrick Meier. 2014.
Tweetcred: Real-time credibility assessment of content on twitter. In International
Conference on Social Informatics. Springer, 228–243.
[14] Nguyen Quoc Viet Hung, Duong Chi Thang, Matthias Weidlich, and Karl Aberer.
2015. Minimizing efforts in validating crowd answers. In SIGMOD. 999–1014.
[15] David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Éva Tardos. 2003. Maximizing the spread of
influence through a social network. In KDD. 137–146.
[16] J. Kim, B. Tabibian, A. Oh, B. Schoelkopf, and M. Gomez-Rodriguez. 2018.
Leveraging the Crowd to Detect and Reduce the Spread of Fake News and
Misinformation. In WSDM ’18: Proceedings of the 11th ACM International
Conference on Web Search and Data Mining.
[17] Srijan Kumar, Robert West, and Jure Leskovec. 2016. Disinformation on the web:
Impact, characteristics, and detection of wikipedia hoaxes. In WWW. 591–602.
[18] Sejeong Kwon, Meeyoung Cha, and Kyomin Jung. 2017. Rumor detection over
varying time windows. PloS one 12, 1 (2017), e0168344.
[19] Jure Leskovec and Julian J Mcauley. 2012. Learning to discover social circles in
ego networks. In NIPS. 539–547.
[20] Yaliang Li, Qi Li, Jing Gao, Lu Su, Bo Zhao, Wei Fan, and Jiawei Han. 2015. On
the discovery of evolving truth. In KDD. 675–684.
[21] Mengchen Liu, Liu Jiang, Junlin Liu, Xiting Wang, Jun Zhu, and Shixia Liu.
2017. Improving Learning-from-Crowds through Expert Validation. In IJCAI.
2329–2336.
[22] Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, and Hans Klein. 2012. # bias: Measuring the
tweeting behavior of propagandists. In AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social
Media.
[23] Tyler Moore and Richard Clayton. 2008. Evaluating the wisdom of crowds in
assessing phishing websites. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5143 (2008),
16–30.
[24] Ian Osband, Dan Russo, and Benjamin Van Roy. 2013. (More) efficient reinforce-
ment learning via posterior sampling. In NIPS. 3003–3011.
[25] Poynter. 2016. International Fact-Checking Network: Fact-Checkers Code
Principles. https://www.poynter.org/international-
fact-checking-network-fact-checkers-
code-principles. (September 2016).
[26] Marian-Andrei Rizoiu, Lexing Xie, Scott Sanner, Manuel Cebrián, Honglin Yu, and
Pascal Van Hentenryck. 2017. Expecting to be HIP: Hawkes Intensity Processes
for Social Media Popularity. In WWW. 735–744.
[27] Victoria L Rubin, Yimin Chen, and Niall J Conroy. 2015. Deception detection for
news: three types of fakes. Proceedings of the Association for Information Science
and Technology 52, 1 (2015), 1–4.
[28] Behzad Tabibian, Isabel Valera, Mehrdad Farajtabar, Le Song, Bernhard Schölkopf,
and Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez. 2017. Distilling information reliability and source
trustworthiness from digital traces. In WWW. 847–855.
[29] William R Thompson. 1933. On the likelihood that one unknown probability
exceeds another in view of the evidence of two samples. Biometrika 25, 3/4 (1933),
285–294.
[30] Hastagiri P Vanchinathan, Andreas Marfurt, Charles-Antoine Robelin, Donald
Kossmann, and Andreas Krause. 2015. Discovering valuable items from massive
data. In KDD. 1195–1204.
[31] Svitlana Volkova, Kyle Shaffer, Jin Yea Jang, and Nathan Hodas. 2017. Separating
Facts from Fiction: Linguistic Models to Classify Suspicious and Trusted News
Posts on Twitter. In ACL, Vol. 2. 647–653.
[32] Gang Wang, Manish Mohanlal, Christo Wilson, Xiao Wang, Miriam J. Metzger,
Haitao Zheng, and Ben Y. Zhao. 2013. Social Turing Tests: Crowdsourcing Sybil
Detection. In NDSS.
[33] William Yang Wang. 2017. "Liar, Liar Pants on Fire": A New Benchmark Dataset
for Fake News Detection. In ACL. 422–426.
[34] Wei Wei and XiaojunWan. 2017. Learning to Identify Ambiguous and Misleading
News Headlines. In IJCAI. 4172–4178.
[35] Shu Wu, Qiang Liu, Yong Liu, Liang Wang, and Tieniu Tan. 2016. Information
Credibility Evaluation on Social Media.. In AAAI. 4403–4404.
[36] Bo Zhao, Benjamin IP Rubinstein, Jim Gemmell, and Jiawei Han. 2012. A bayesian
approach to discovering truth from conflicting sources for data integration.
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 5, 6 (2012), 550–561.
[37] Qingyuan Zhao, Murat A. Erdogdu, Hera Y. He, Anand Rajaraman, and Jure
Leskovec. 2015. SEISMIC: A Self-Exciting Point Process Model for Predicting
Tweet Popularity. In KDD. 1513–1522.
[38] Zhe Zhao, Paul Resnick, and QiaozhuMei. 2015. Enquiring minds: Early detection
of rumors in social media from enquiry posts. In WWW. 1395–1405.
[39] Elena Zheleva, Aleksander Kolcz, and Lise Getoor. 2008. Trusting spam reporters:
A reporter-based reputation system for email filtering. TOIS 27, 1 (2008), 3.
